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DAVID LINDSAY AND THE SHAPE OF 





David Lindsay’s literary reputation survives largely on the basis of his first 
novel, A Voyage to Arcturus. First published in 1920, this ostensibly 
science fiction adventure sold poorly in Lindsay’s lifetime but has attracted 
many more readers since and remains in print. By contrast, his later stories 
have been overlooked and have been difficult to obtain. This may change, 
as there are now readily available editions of, for example, Sphinx, first 
published in  1923, and Devil’s Tor, first published in 1932. In total, 
Lindsay produced seven novels, including one unfinished at his death,  not 
published till 1976, and an unpublished collection of aphorisms, first 
published in 1972.   
The similarities and resonances throughout the stories suggest a unity 
of vision, and in this respect, Lindsay’s work warrants closer scrutiny and 
critical evaluation. It is sometimes said of the later stories that they are 
marred by defects in literary style. In an early critical survey, J. B. Pick 
suggested Lindsay’s disappointment at the reception of his earlier work 
had led him to write for his own satisfaction, anticipating he would be 
ignored and so neglecting the demands of readers.
1
 Nevertheless, his books 
can sustain a reader’s interest in the intellectual puzzles they deal in, and 
while a writer’s philosophical ambitions do not excuse deficiencies in 
presentation and structure, Lindsay’s work is interesting in this respect: 
that it is drawn on issues around ideas and the shape they take in art.  
Among the aphorisms which make up his Sketch Notes for a New 
System of Philosophy, Lindsay indicates his primary concern in note (192), 
in which he declares the attainment and communication of the Sublime is 
                                                 
1 J.B. Pick, “The Work of David Lindsay,” Studies in Scottish Literature, 1.3 
(1963): 171-182 (176-177); and cf. Pick’s essay in Colin Wilson, J.B. Pick, and 
E.H. Visiak, The Strange Genius of David Lindsay (London: John Baker, 1970).  
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the “grandest of all ambitions.”
2
 The opening chapter of A Voyage to 
Arcturus certainly challenges readers’ expectations. A number of 
characters attend a séance, but only the late arrivals will carry the story 
forward in the next chapter. The others have no further role and are simply 
dropped. With the reader seemingly in mind, Lindsay allows the spirit 
medium, Mr. Backhouse, to advance a hope that his audience will stay for 
the whole performance, assuring them a manifestation will take place. 
Asked how he is certain, Backhouse only answers that he dreams with eyes 
open and that others see his dreams. His questioner takes little interest in 
this reply and only compliments him on a “beautiful” remark.
3
 All of this, 
of course, is Lindsay’s own stage-setting, like the stage props and orchestra 
Mrs. Trent has organised for the séance, and for which she has imitated an 
Egyptian-themed staging of Mozart’s The Magic Flute. But the direction of 
the story changes abruptly as a terrific sound outside of crashing masonry 
announces the arrival of Maskull and Nightspore, and the conventional 
fiction of the séance is left behind. 
It is telling that Lindsay indicates Mr. Backhouse is not to be taken for 
a charlatan. The third late arrival to the séance, Krag, calls him a “spirit 
usher,” and Lindsay carefully expands on what he does, explaining it in 
terms of making the invisible momentarily solid and coloured. This as 
easily describes Lindsay’s own ambition, to give shape and form to the 
Sublime. If this can have a destructive, Dionysian aspect in the creation of 
new forms, then it is fitting that the sound of crashing masonry signals the 
entrance of Maskull and Nightspore. The story proceeds with their journey 
to Arcturus, to arrive on its planet, Tormance, where Maskull will go in 
search of its god, Surtur, also variously known as Crystalman and Shaping. 
Again, the parallel here is with the shape Lindsay gives to his particular 
vision.  
In this essay, I seek to identify that aesthetic on the basis of his sources 
and some major influences on his thinking. While this may not settle 
questions around the merit of Lindsay’s work in solely literary terms, it 
                                                 
2 Bernard Sellin, The Life and Works of David Lindsay, transl. Kenneth Gunnell 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 175, 245 n. 1. Quotations below 
from Lindsay’s Sketch Notes for a New System of Philosophy are from the selection 
included in Sellin’s study, referenced there and in my text by Lindsay’s own 
numbering. The full typescript, ca. 1920, of Lindsay’s Sketch Notes, with 545 
aphorisms, is in the National Library of Scotland, MS.27247. The first selection 
was published in Lines Review, no. 40 (March 1972), followed by Sellin’s 
selection; the 1972 text was republished with an additional “Twenty Philosophical 
Notes,” in Abraxas, no. 6 (1996); and collected in A Voyage to Arcturus (London: 
Savoy Books, 2002).  
3 David Lindsay, A Voyage to Arcturus (London: Methuen, 1920; London: 




does provide a framework for judging whether he succeeds or falls short in 
his ambition. I propose that a way into making this judgement is through 
the use Lindsay makes of the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel, including some 
of Hegel’s own imagery. In Hegel’s philosophy, the universal Spirit 
(Geist), or the Absolute, is realised in mankind’s own self-development, 
including a progression in artistic and religious forms and expression. This 
has a basis in the central tenet of Jacob Boehme’s theology, in which the 
divine is dependent on creation for its own self-realisation. I propose this 
underpins the sense in which David Lindsay intends the invisible is made 
visible, in the shaping of his characters’ own self-realisations, and through 
the reader’s own engagement with the texts. 
In his study of Lindsay’s life and works, Bernard Sellin arrives at a 
broadly Platonic account of his appeal to the Sublime, citing number (337) 
of the Sketch Notes, in which Lindsay writes: “The Sublime world is not a 
metaphysical theory but a terrible fact, which stands above and behind the 
world, and governs all its manifestations.”
4
 Similarly, he points to the 
character Peter Copping’s talk in Devil’s Tor, of experiencing the Sublime 
in privileged moments like “a violent rent in the noisome fogs of life,” and 
he treats this in terms of insight into a transcendent reality.
5
 This supports a 
sense of an imprisoned soul and its redemption in escape from the confines 
of egoistic individuality and our “common” attachments to the everyday 
world. At stake is some notion of a “higher” self, as something obscured in 
conventional dealings in the world, or drawn as a conflict between man in 
nature and a sense of the divine. But Lindsay himself, in note (204), in 
which he says the Sublime world is far more real, still insists on its 
vivacity and substantiality being “a key to the understanding of world-
life.”
6
 That is to say, in relation to the actual world we live in, not a world 
behind it. 
The issue here is important in deciding a broadly framed approach to 
Lindsay’s work as a whole. Particularly open to question are claims made 
for its gnostic character. The memorable line from the Voyage, that 
“Crystalman’s Empire is but a shadow on the face of Muspel” can suggest 
a gnostic vision of a “false” creator god, presiding over an illusory world, 
obscuring what is real (Voyage, 280). But a recognition of the influence of 
Hegel’s philosophy will serve to revise and clarify what has been too easily 
labelled Lindsay’s gnosticism. Repeatedly, throughout his stories, Lindsay 
speaks in terms of how the invisible is made visible. This draws attention 
to what is “visible” in the texts themselves, which is only to say that the 
                                                 
4 Sellin, Life and Works,  177. 
5 Sellin, 179, citing David Lindsay, Devil’s Tor (orig. London: G.P. Putnam, 1932; 
repr. n.p.: Bookship, 2018), 476; subsequent references in the text.  
6 Sellin, 245, n.5.  
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Sublime is tied to matters around the choice of imagery or to the symbolic 
character generally of the stories. And with the Hegelian sense of self-
realisation in human creativity as a basis for addressing Lindsay’s 
intentions in putting his ideas into fiction, his characters are not merely 
juxtapositions of ideas. Rather, the stories have an initiatory aspect, 
similarly to what has been claimed for Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, in 
which the self-realisation of Spirit is expressed in Hegel’s philosophy 
through the very form this text takes in communicating it.
7
 
In Sphinx and Devil’s Tor, published in 1923 and 1932 respectively, 
Lindsay draws on chapter VII of the Phenomenology of Spirit, with the key 
image in each book, the black stone in Devil’s Tor and the Egyptian 
sphinx, tied to their symbolic character in the use that Hegel makes of 
them.
8
 Sellin has pointed out Lindsay’s immersion in German philosophy, 
in Hegel and Boehme, and more importantly, he says, in Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche, but he does not go into detail. For example, he only notes that 
the character Saltfleet in Devil’s Tor “has something of the aura of 
Nietzsche’s grandeur about him,” without addressing Nietzsche’s influence 
as such.
9
 I shall argue that Lindsay’s philosophical stance is closely 
modelled on that of Hegel and Jacob Boehme. I shall also challenge the 
view that Lindsay dismisses the world as wholly illusory. Rather, what is 
“real” is delivered in mankind’s own intellectual development, as its own 
self-realisation, and so made “visible.” The scare quotes here are only to 
indicate that as a philosophical position, and so briefly outlined, this 
requires much further exposition and scrutiny, but I am concerned 




Lindsay’s Sphinx begins with Nicholas Cabot taking up lodgings with the 
Sturt family. He has invented a machine for recording unconscious 
dreaming and sets about constructing it, with the paid help of Maurice 
Ferreira. The central character in the book is Lore Jensen, a musical 
composer who latterly has lost her inspiration. In Cabot’s trials with the 
machine she appears in dream scenarios and the book ends with one of the 
Sturt daughters, Evelyn, recording her own father’s dreaming as he lies 
unconscious, having collapsed on hearing that Lore Jensen has drowned. 
There is a relation between these visionary scenes and the events played 
out by the characters in the actual world. One or other is seemingly a 
                                                 
7 See Glenn Alexander Magee, Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2001). 
8
 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, transl. A. V. Miller, with with analysis 
of the text and foreword by J.N. Findlay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 410-478. 




shadow world, and there is a demonic aspect to the character of Maurice 
Ferreira, with whom Lore Jensen is in a destructive relationship. 
The title of the book is from her piano composition. This enigmatic 
piece is described as starting drowsily, building like a rising storm, then 
quietening in the end to take shape as an “indubitable question.”
10
 In the 
characters’ discussion which follows Evelyn’s playing, Lore is said never 
to explain what was in her mind when writing it. The enigma, then, is to 
say what its riddle is. Reflecting on the title, and taking the Egyptian 
sphinx as a personification of Nature, Evelyn suggests it signifies a 
question, why we are living in the world, which the inability to answer 
requires that we must die. In section (71) of The World as Will and 
Representation, Schopenhauer remarks that humans, unlike other animals 
close to “mother nature,” are alone in having a metaphysical need to find 
meaning in the world.
11
 Boasting in a letter that his own philosophy had 
answered the riddle of existence, he declared he would like to have a signet 
ring made with an image of the sphinx falling into the abyss.
12
  
Approaches to Lindsay’s work have emphasised the influence of 
Schopenhauer, and not least in terms of a pessimistic judgement that life is 
characterised by pain and suffering. But Schopenhauer also writes in 
section (71) that a saintly denial of life cannot aspire to its complete 
negation without incoherence. Our lives are a painful litany of 
disappointment consequent on the frustration of our will, but to try to 
envisage a release into nothing at all is only a kind of mysticism, even if 
we give it a name, such as Nirvana. As such, the ascetic’s negation is, he 
says, inexorably tied to what is negated.
13
 Nicholas Cabot declares a 
recognisably Schopenhauerian asceticism in relation to the company of 
women, but, nevertheless, he is quickly caught up in the various intrigues 
forming the body of the narrative. There is also more at stake in Lindsay’s 
Sphinx, and in his other works, than just an allegory of Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysics of Will. 
It is significant that Nicholas Cabot disagrees with Evelyn in their 
discussion around Lore Jensen’s composition. In contrast to Evelyn’s 
suggestion, he characterises the sphinx as a goddess of dreams, as standing 
for the way in which a deep unconscious activity can attain visible form. 
Importantly, this is a precise allusion to the place Hegel accords Egyptian 
religion in the self-realisation of Spirit, or the Absolute. The starting point 
                                                 
10 David Lindsay, Sphinx (orig. London: John Long, 1923; [n.p.]: Bookship, 2019), 
30; subsequent references in the text.  
11 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, transl. E.F.J Payne 
(New York: Dover, 1969). 
12 Margrieta Beer, Schopenhauer (London: T.C. & E.C. Jack, 1914), 27.  
13 Schopenhauer, 408-412. 
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of Hegel’s thinking is traceable to Boehme’s account of God coming to 
know Himself only through the Creation. In Hegel’s philosophy, this 
informs the general sense in which self-awareness depends upon reflection 
in an “other”. The self-realisation of the Absolute in religion is addressed 
in chaper VII. There, Hegel begins with natural religion and its progression 
to a subsequent form, in art. On the cusp of this transition is the shape it 
takes in the Egyptians’ religious iconography. 
The relevant paragraph in the Phenomenology is (697), where Hegel 
identifies a tension in the human spirit seeking its self-conscious separation 
from animalistic Nature, which is expressed in such half-animal, half-
human forms as the Egyptian sphinx.
14
 Hegel expands on this in his 
Lectures on Fine Art, where he notes the Egyptians set up hundreds of 
sculpted sphinxes in rows and on a huge scale, and explains the import of 
this visually symbolic form, having the hybrid character of a woman’s 
head on the body of a lion. At issue is the limited form of this 
representation: 
 
Out of the dull strength and power of the animal the human spirit 
tries to push itself forward, without coming to a perfect portrayal of 
its own freedom and animated shape, because it must still remain 
confused and associated with what is other than itself.15  
 
The key point Hegel goes on to make here is that, as a monster asking a 
riddle, the sculpted sphinx is itself symbolic of the Absolute’s struggle for 
self-awareness. I suggest that Lindsay, through Cabot, indicates Hegel’s 
view of self-realisation emerging out of what is strange or “other” to it. 
This characterises Lore Jensen’s own inspiration, and it underpins the 
characters’ interactions with each other. It can also be Lindsay’s intention 
for his own texts, in regard to their visionary episodes and in being 




The theme of self-realisation is picked up again in Devil’s Tor. Here, the 
narrative is centred on the bringing together of two halves of a mysterious 
black stone. It begins with Hugh Drapier visiting his cousin Ingrid 
Fleming, who lives with her mother, Helga, and uncle Magnus, on the edge 
of Dartmoor. Drapier has returned from abroad with the stone, which was 
entrusted to him by an archaeologist, Stephen Arsinal, and his companion, 
Henry Saltfleet. They have stolen it from a remote temple in Tibet, and do 
not want to be caught in possession of it while making their escape back to 
Britain. A fated sequence of events is seemingly at work as Drapier 
                                                 
14 Hegel, Phenomenology, 423.  
15 G.W.F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, transl. T. M. Knox, 2 vols 




subsequently discovers the other half in an ancient tomb on Dartmoor, 
beneath Devil’s Tor. The characters are all affected by the presence of 
these stones, some having visions of an ancient goddess figure associated 
with it. Ingrid Fleming is fated to re-embody this goddess figure. Her 
fiancé, Peter Copping, had seen in her a “glimpse of the Unseen” (Devil’s 
Tor, 477), and painted her as the youthful Madonna. But she breaks her 
engagement to him in favour of Saltfleet, and with the stone halves joined 
again, the story ends with an anticipation of some kind of human renewal 
or revaluation. 
Having played his part in bringing back the other half of the stone, 
Drapier dies when a loosened boulder on Devil’s Tor rolls towards him. He 
is a kind of gloomy ascetic, and in chapter VI he dwells on three “strains” 
on his life. First and second, these are his anticipation of death and his 
resignation in respect of seemingly fated circumstances. The other is 
simply his amazement in staring into the black stone in his possession, 
which he describes as: 
 
the most amazing vision of natural beauty, reduced to the 
dimensions of art, that could at any time possibly have existed on 
earth. It amazed, because it was as living as a mirror reflecting real 
things, and yet the real things in its case were nowhere present 
(Devil’s Tor, 86) 
 
His thoughts repeat Lindsay’s theme of the invisible made visible. 
Drapier also reflects on his own experiences taken as an intimation of the 
Sublime, as reminders of “some grander world not present,” and offers his 
“formula” that: 
 
the merely beautiful might suffice a soul, but that the sublime 
(which was the shadow of the beauty of another world) could never 
suffice, since with it came gropings that must amount to pain (82). 
 
Sellin cites note (79) of the Sketch Notes, where Lindsay distinguishes 
the Sublime from beauty.
16
 This is taken by Sellin in the context of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy but treated as departing from it. Whatever may 
be said of this, he continues in his supposition that Schopenhauer stands as 
Lindsay’s mentor, primarily emphasising Lindsay’s pessimism. 
It is the case that in his brooding on the futility of life, Drapier is 
implicitly Schopenhauerian. But attention can as easily be focused on the 
character of Saltfleet, who, by contrast, exemplifies a more Nietzschean 
aesthetic, in which his affirmation of life is coupled to a distance on it, and 
on himself. This would make room for a Sublime drawn on the “rarer 
pathos” Nietzsche talks of in aphorism (257) of Beyond Good and Evil as 
                                                 
16 Sellin, 176. 
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“an ever new widening of distance in the soul itself.”
17
 For Nietzsche, it 
remains that this distancing is tied to the way the world is, with his 
emphasis on hierarchies and rank. Philosophical positions are divided in 
this way among Lindsay’s characters and narrative lines. In which case, the 
nature of Lindsay’s attitude to the Sublime, and to its communication, must 
be looked for in the stories taken as a whole, through the choices he makes 
in seeking to express it. Again, I argue that he draws primarily on Hegel. 
Another example here is the claim Sellin makes for Schopenhauer’s 
influence being reflected in the character of Magnus Colborne in Devil’s 
Tor.
18
 Lindsay describes Colborne as physically resembling Schopenhauer. 
But Colborne’s contribution to the discussion around art, in chapter XI of 
the book, is actually marked by Helga as an uncharacteristic departure 
from his usual attitude, showing “an altogether new aspect” (Devil’s Tor, 
176). The characters in the story all, in various ways, fulfil a set of fated 
occurrences. And it seems Colborne, too, is affected by the proximity of 
the stone in speaking so uncharacteristically. He turns to encouraging Peter 
to paint images of the Madonna and goes on to declare the source of the 
universe in a feminine principle, which he expands upon as having been 
symbolised through the ages in a variety of goddess cults, as worship of the 
Great Mother, with the Virgin Mary its most recent iteration. With the 
significance Hegel attaches to this imagery, which I turn to next, 
Colborne’s change of view is marking that Lindsay draws on Hegel over 
Schopenhauer.  
But first, it is the stone itself which points to Hegel’s philosophy 
providing the broader framework of Lindsay’s approach. In 
Phenomenology of Spirit, in paragraph (696), Hegel writes of an inner 
being which is “in the first instance, still simple darkness, the unmoved, 
the black, formless stone,” and he refers to the stone in the Kaaba at 
Mecca. Hegel is talking of Spirit, or the Absolute, as an artificer not yet 
aware of itself in what it shapes, which, as J.N. Findlay puts it, “lingers 
darkly in the background; when he does represent himself it is in the 
shapelessness of a black stone.”
19
 Hegel says in (696) that the shape 
produced by the artificer is the covering for this inner being. As such, it is 
an “unessential husk” (Phenomenology, 423). 
In the Lectures on Fine Art, Hegel writes that if Spirit is realised in art, 
then it is so only in the form of a profound feeling, in its essential nature 
identified as love. It is a spiritual existence at stake here, and Hegel affirms 
                                                 
17 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, transl. Judith Norman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 151. 
18 Sellin, 175. 




its sublimity in distinguishing it from the appearance of beauty grounded in 
the sensuous. The essence of love is given as: 
 
forgetting oneself in another self, yet in this surrender and oblivion 
having and possessing oneself alone.20  
 
This is Spirit encountering itself in human form, and, as Stern explains,  
it succeeds the kinds of natural religion like that of the Egyptians, because 
it is a revelation of the divine’s self-realisation in man.
21
 Away from the 
complexities of Hegel’s account of revealed religion, the progression here 
is also a transition in art itself, from what has been said already about the 
nature of the Egyptian sculpted sphinx, to the paintings of Madonnas 
which Colborne is encouraging Peter Copping to paint. Lindsay is drawing 
on Hegel’s account of this transition in art. In the Lectures on Fine Art, 
Hegel says that even if an Egyptian sculpture of Isis holding Horus on her 
knees might be said to have the same subject as Christian paintings of 
Madonna and child, the essential character of Spirit, as love, is absent from 
it: 
 
What has Raphael or indeed any other of the great Italian masters 
not made of the Madonna and the Christ-child! What depth of 
feeling, what spiritual life, what inner wealth of profound emotion, 
what sublimity and charm, what a human heart, though one wholly 
penetrated by the divine Spirit, does not speak to us out of every 
line of these pictures! … But above all it is not the visible beauty of 
the figures but the spiritual animation (Fine Art, 3.III, ch.1 (1)). 
 
I suggest that Lindsay’s narratives concern just this kind of progression in 
the self-realisation of Spirit, as a revelation of the Sublime, or of the 
essence of love. 
It is the pre-conceptual response to such images, in their symbolic 
character, which underpins their use, not least in the visionary scenes 
which occur in Lindsay’s stories. Again, the theme is visualising the 
invisible, not in delivering a meaning, but as communicating the Sublime. 
It is in this respect that Helga questions Peter Copping on how an artist can 
succeed in seeking to express “the invisible by the visible,” present the 
“true soul”, the deepest part of personality (Devil’s Tor, 165). Again, the 
discussion begins with a recognisably Schopenhauerian position. Peter 
Copping declares the serenity of a painted scene is illusory, and that 
beneath a painting’s quietness there should be visible “the mighty 
workings of the spirit.” Painting is inferior, he says, to the way in which a 
cathedral vault or Beethoven symphony produce a terrific emotion in us, 
and he appeals to the same example of Dutch masters which Schopenhauer 
                                                 
20 Hegel, Fine Art, I.2.III.ch. 1 (2a). 
21 Robert Stern, Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit (London: Routledge, 
2002), 190-191. 
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himself employs. Their serenity is conducive to an illusion, and covers a 
violent agitation which is, as it were, the reality. In this respect, Copping is 
acknowledging Schopenhauer’s regard for the greater profundity of music, 
as expressing the “inner being, the in-itself of the world,” which, he says, 
we conceptually mark as will. 
22
 
Copping also dismisses allegorical painting as “wall decoration with a 
label attached” (Devil’s Tor, 167), which is a point Schopenhauer makes in 
precisely those terms, that such art achieves no more than an inscription. 
“Allegory in plastic and pictorial art is a mistaken effort, serving a purpose 
entirely foreign to art,” and this is worse, he says, when the meaning is 
founded on conventional associations of ideas, such as the image of a rose 
indicating secrecy.
23
 This is what Schopenhauer marks as merely 
symbolical, or emblematic, as a degenerate kind of allegory. But the issue 
here is complicated by terminology. I shall distinguish symbol from 
allegory as a kind of picture-thinking, in contrast to its conceptual “de-
coding.” The difference is between, say, an eagle’s gaze as symbol of its 
regal bearing, just because it expresses that nobility, and something like the 
analyses of dream imagery in which the images are treated as standing for 
other things, as in Schopenhauer’s example of the rose standing for 
secrecy. I adhere to this in my approach to Lindsay’s texts. 
The distinction is important in approaching Lindsay’s own use of 
imagery. Allegory says something in some other terms which are more 
familiar, or perhaps more amenable, or which may, after all, be cryptic and 
baffling, but where the challenge is to look beyond their literal meaning. 
The particular discussion in Devil’s Tor has not been adequately addressed 
in the critical literature. J.B. Pick referred to it only briefly before moving 
on, while Kathryn Hume’s analysis of A Voyage to Arcturus treated the 
story as fundamentally allegorical.
24
 But the distinction is integral to the 
role Lindsay accords the visionary scenes in his books, in the replayed 
“dreams” recorded by Cabot’s machine in Sphinx, or the goddess imagery 
in Devil’s Tor. Peter Copping’s Schopenhauerian remarks are not the final 
word on what is at stake here. Symbolic imagery, in the sense I have 
indicated, is tied to what Hegel marks as “picture-thinking” and its role in 
the self-realisation of Spirit. In section (776) of Phenomenology of Spirit, 
                                                 
22 Schopenhauer, 264. 
23 Ibid., 237-239. 
24 Pick, as in n. 1 above, 172; Kathryn Hume, “Visionary Allegory in David 
Lindsay’s A Voyage to Arcturus,” Journal of English and Germanic Philology, 77 







Hegel addresses how mankind’s self-consciousness arises as the 
recognition of his separation from animal nature, which is seen as “other,” 
and as an evil. In its picture form, it is the Bible story of the “fall” of man, 
eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. It has a positive 
aspect because it sets in motion a return to the pre-fallen state. As such, it 
is the ascent of Spirit, in coming to self-knowledge through the creation. 
But crucially, at the level of picture-thinking, Spirit is identical with the 
diverse forms and shapes in Creation. Under this aspect, in Lindsay’s 
Voyage, it is the god sought by Maskull, under the name Shaping.   
It was seen above how Lindsay draws on Hegel’s appeal to the image 
of the sphinx, as symbolising the self-realisation of human spirit out of 
what is “other” to it. In this role, such an image is identical with what it 
purports to sign. This characterisation of symbolic imagery is traceable to 
the work of Georg Friedrich Creuzer, with which Hegel was familiar, 
having known him personally as well. In Creuzer’s Symbolik und 
Mythologie der Alten Vӧlker (1819), the distinction between symbol and 
allegory was key to his argument that a religious symbolism originated 
with a priestly caste in ancient India and was subsequently received into 
other cultures.
25
 It is integral to this transmission that the symbol carries its 
own significance, independently of language. Creuzer points to images of a 
slaughtered bull, for example, which are widely distributed across different 
cultures, highlighting their use on coins and other artefacts. In its symbolic 
character, it is of a piece with an image like that of an eagle’s stare, which 
effectively is what it signs, because the image already gives the sense of 
the bird’s regal bearing. Creuzer treats this symbolic character as 
complemented by a symbol’s openness to further interpretation, where this 
tension then provides it is suited to religious ceremony and a priest’s 
activity in turning people away from everyday concerns. 
There are accounts of Creuzer’s theory of symbolism in Gadamer and 
Todorov, and the wider context and implications of his theory of cultural 
transmission have been set out by Williamson.
26
 In section (30) of the first 
volume of Symbolik und Mythologie der Alten Vӧlker, an image of sunlight 
fractured into a rainbow spectrum by obscuring clouds is Creuzer’s own 
metaphor for the complexity in a symbol’s meaning, in which symbolic 
character and a plurality of interpretations are joined.
27
 A symbol has force 
                                                 
25 Friedrich Creuzer, Symbolik und Mythologie der Alten Völker (Leipzig und 
Darmstadt: Beiheyer und Leske, 1819). 
26 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. (London: Sheed & Ward, 1993); 
Tzvetan Todorov, Theories of the Symbol, transl. Catherine Porter (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1982); George S. Williamson, The Longing for Myth in 
Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press (2004).  
27 Creuzer, 58-59.  
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in pointing “beyond” conventional associations. And in the context of 
religious practices, this fractured meaning allows a sense in which the 
symbol reconciles two realms, human and divine, to recover an “original 
connection” between gods and men. Williamson explains, as well, how 
work by the brothers Grimm, and by Franz Josef Mone, who was a student 
of Creuzer, was instrumental in establishing a Germanic mythology drawn 
from the Nordic Eddas and from German folklore; Jacob Grimm, in 
Deutsche Mythologie, added the supposition of an Earth Mother cult, 
drawing on Tacitus’ description in Germania of the worship of a goddess, 
Hertha.
28
   
Lindsay’s interest in these aspects of German culture is evident in 
Devil’s Tor, when Magnus Colborne expounds on motherhood and a 
female Nature, and on what he takes to be the fact of worship of the Great 
Mother “under many names, in many lands” (Devil’s Tor, 174-179). And 
the influence of Creuzer’s work on Hegel has been argued by Magee,  who 
points to it as underpinning the sense of a “pre-reflective wisdom” and its 
partial but developing expression in the progress of art, religion and 
philosophy.
29
 This is the activity of the Absolute, seeking its self-conscious 
realisation in mankind, as an “unconsciously busy” activity of thought in 
all our purposes and interests (ibid., 84-85).  
Specifically, Creuzer regarded the symbolism of the Virgin Mary as 
continuing that of Demeter and Cybele. The same can be said of the 
ancient goddess in Devil’s Tor, and which is tied to Ingrid Fleming’s fated 
role. As an image, it is, in Lindsay’s story, simply that of a goddess or 
regal woman, very tall, and clothed in “antique draperies, of no 
recognisable fashion” (Devil’s Tor, 39). It is also personified in Ingrid 
Fleming herself. These are, as it were, its covering shapes. This is indicated 
in Helga’s reflections on how her daughter has been affected by what has 
happened: 
 
She was ceasing to be her girl, and changing to some more ancient 
ancestral self, such as she, her mother, might never understand; but 
its externals – this new alien nature’s – could scarcely be more than 
hard shell for a seed infinitely rich and tender, unable as yet to face 
the world’s mocks, sneers and violations … she meant, such hints 
beneath Ingrid’s apathy as these faint stirrings, like the half seen, 
half imagined troubling from below the surface of a drowsing lake: 
of haughtiness, sibylline vision, foreignness, power … they were 
not new, however, but very old, very intrinsic in her opening, 
wondering soul (Devil’s Tor, 404-405). 
 
                                                 
28 Williamson, 107.  




Helga goes on to remark this could be the vestige of a prehistoric type, 
from before the founding of the great religions. As such, it is a pre-




This is the point at which to question claims of a gnostic vision in 
Lindsay’s work. In addressing what he argues is the hermetic character of 
Hegel’s thinking, Magee points to a crucial difference between hermetic 
and gnostic perspectives. The difference is a clear one. In hermeticism, 
God’s own knowledge of himself depends upon His creative activity, 
through the realisation of that knowledge in mankind. By contrast, the 
gnostic entirely separates God and creation, and refuses to allow God is in 
any way dependent on mankind.
30
 This is important to assessing what has 
been claimed for the gnostic character of David Lindsay’s stories. In 
adherence to Hegel’s philosophy, Lindsay’s position is similarly hermetic. 
Hegel talks in terms of Spirit’s own return to itself, through its activity in 
the world. This requires turning away from the everyday interests which 
comprise our egoistic selves. But, crucially, this is not a simple intuition of 
something “beyond” or higher than us, or of our dissolution in some 
original unity. Rather, it depends upon a particular sense of negating, 
through which what is real must know itself as subject: 
 
the life of God and divine cognition may well be spoken of as a 
disporting of Love with itself; but this idea sinks into mere 
edification, and even insipidity, if it lacks the seriousness, the 
suffering, the patience, and the labour of the negative.31 
 
The negative is a process of formation of a Subject through its 
alienation from what is “other” to it, together with reflection in this 
otherness. This dynamic sense of the “labour of the negative” opposes any 
supposition that existence is unriddled in some mystic intuition, or that we 
might start from some immediate knowledge of the Absolute, starting, in 
Hegel’s metaphor, like a “shot from a pistol” (ibid., 16). It is telling in 
Sphinx, that Maurice Ferreira makes his demands on Lore Jensen at 
gunpoint, and is found, in the end, to be really soulless.  
Finally, it is implicit as well, that in this labour of the negative, the self-
realisation of Spirit is delivered in following Hegel’s own exposition of the 
course it takes. This is the sense in which Hegel’s philosophy is initiatory, 
enabling the reader’s own transcendence in a higher self, as a kind of 
purification in anticipation of Wisdom.
32
 At the level of Lindsay’s artistry, 
the same may be claimed for his stories, in ambition at least. His 
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31 Hegel, Phenomenology, 10.  
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characters’ self-realisations are frustrated or partial, and, as with Lore 
Jensen’s musical composition, there remains the artistic limitations of the 
stories themselves. But it need not be supposed that Lindsay is seeking to 
answer a riddle, as such. Rather, the stories are his own sculpted sphinx, a 
hybrid of the mundane egoism of the characters’ everyday concerns and 
interests, and their reflection in a supernatural “other.” The visionary 
character of the disturbances they suffer emphasises a symbolic imagery 
over mere allegory. As such, Lindsay indicates the pre-rational, partial self-
realisation of Geist in art and in its labour of the negative. But it is 
mankind as symbol of the divine which constitutes Hegel’s hermeticism, 




The visionary scenes in Sphinx and Devil’s Tor are coupled to narratives 
which play out in the stories through the characters’ interrelations with 
each other in the everyday world of egoistic concerns and conventional 
attitudes. The affective power of these scenes generally is drawn by 
Lindsay on their visually symbolic character, distinct from the conceptual 
associations which would sustain an allegorical interpretation. The latter 
kind of interpretation would itself only reflect our “common” language and 
cultural conventions. For Peter Copping in Devil’s Tor, the question how 
to express “the invisible by the visible” is raised in terms of whether an 
artist must dismiss these conventional “outsides” as false, and be 
determined only to paint “insides.” He answers that outsides are not false, 
as such, but frequently “disagree with what they cover” (Devil’s Tor, 166-
167). The same may be said of much of what goes on in Lindsay’s later 
stories, in which characters puzzle over their relations with each other, 
while unsettled by supernatural disturbances. In Sphinx, for example, the 
insides are made visible by Cabot’s dream-recording machine and 
experienced on playback. I have argued Lindsay takes this inside-outside 
relation in the way that Hegel talks of inner being and its “unessential 
husk.”
33
 The “inner” is visible in the way that Peter Copping remarks that 
“a symbol is a mystic sign of the Creator” (Devil’s Tor, 167). 
How far Lindsay succeeds in his ambition to communicate the sublime 
is a matter of his own capabilities as writer. There is an initiatory aspect if 
the text is intended as conjuring an awareness in the reader, however 
opaque, of something, as it were, behind the story. This is perhaps more 
successful in Sphinx, where we might suppose the dark, unconscious 
dreamworld is struggling for self-realisation in Lindsay’s own artistry, as 
much as it would be in Lore Jensen’s musical composition. Lindsay’s text 
                                                 




would be like Cabot’s recording machine in this respect. If it succeeds in 
unsettling the reader, then it is initiatory in the way that is claimed for 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, where his exposition of the vicissitudes 
of Spirit is itself a means to its self-realisation, in the reader’s 
consciousness.
34
 In Lindsay’s literary form, its partial realisation is the 
limitations of a visual symbolism. It is, in any case, the obstacles to 
realising the sublime which make up the bulk of Lindsay’s narratives. At 
issue is whether the visual character of his visionary scenes is, as it were, a 
way of shortcutting these tribulations. It is more likely they are 
complementary. Lindsay defended, for example, the characters’ laborious 
deliberations in Devil’s Tor as integral to his concerns in the story. Further 
call may be made on details of Hegel’s philosophy here, but I have sought 
to emphasise that aspect of Lindsay’s texts which relies on a particular use 
of symbolism and its implications for the hermeticism that I have argued is 
the basis of his world-vision. 
 
Staffordshire University 
                                                 
34 Magee, 127-149.  
